The Field

Ethiopia's War Is Not Staying in Ethiopia, and Somalia Stands to Pay for It

Tigrayans fight Tigrayans, young people are fleeing, and the neighbours that once argued over a dam are now circling a war. Somalia hosts Ethiopian refugees, shares a border with Al-Shabaab territory and sits at the centre of a diplomatic scramble. I saw this kind of corridor diplomacy at the African Union, and it does not tell the public what is at stake.

A collapsed house in a street in Hawzen, Tigray, with a pile of rubble and broken roof beams. A few people stand far down the street.
A house destroyed in the battles for the town of Hawzen, Tigray, on 6 June 2021, during the last war. File photo, not from the current fighting.Photo: Yan Boechat/Voice of America, via Wikimedia Commons, public domain
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At African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, you will always see in the corridors that the press statements have nothing to do with what is really going on inside the building. One day I was minding my own business when I saw a Sudanese envoy talking to an Egyptian diplomat. This was back when Ethiopia was building the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

You could see from his face that the Egyptian was not happy. He was making sounds with his fingers, and you could see his fury at the tension the dam was creating. He said to the Sudanese, “For you it is regional diplomacy, but for us it is life and death.”

The Sudanese envoy just looked tired. He was not arguing. He was only listening.

It was a corridor, so there were a lot of people around. I could also see an Eritrean envoy or diplomat. I do not know which he was, but he was watching, from close range, the intense conversation taking place in front of him, as I was. I was amazed to see how different things are outside the official statements.

That was years ago. Today those same countries are tangled in a war that began on September 22 or 23 in Tigray, and the question I keep returning to is the one the Egyptian diplomat answered in a corridor: who is this war regional diplomacy for, and who is it life and death for? The headlines treat Ethiopia’s war as a fight between a government and a regional party. For the people who live next door, it is already a refugee crisis, a recruitment opportunity for Al-Shabaab, and a test of every government in the Horn. Somalia in particular stands to pay for a war it did not start.

I served as Somalia’s Youth Representative to the African Union from 2019 to 2021, working from AU headquarters in Addis Ababa. I engaged young people across Africa, including Ethiopians, so that youth could play a role in stabilizing the Ethiopian conflict. I watched the war unfold. I saw the frustration of Ethiopian youth leaders, and how peace was taken away from Ethiopian communities. Although I was there to represent Somali youth at the African Union, I was also engaged in issues affecting African countries and African people. My observations are my own and I could not verify them independently. I set out the alliance, the collapse of the 2022 Pretoria peace agreement and the drone war in African Arguments on 25 September.

Who started it? Each side says the other

The government and Getachew Reda, an adviser to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, say the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) seized three airports and launched an all-out offensive on 23 September. The Tigray regional government says federal forces invaded and that it entered a defensive war. CNN notes it is unclear what led to the fighting. The fighting has moved quickly since. Government-allied forces took Mekelle on October 3 after the TPLF said it had “temporarily moved out,” Al Jazeera reported, and on October 16 Abiy named a six-month caretaker administration for Tigray. That did not end the war. Critical Threats’ review of October 23 reports a Tigrayan counteroffensive in central Tigray and federal advances on Abiy Addi and other towns that week, and a caretaker official urged TPLF fighters to disarm on October 23, AP reported.

The pro-government Tigray Peace Forces are former Tigray Defence Forces fighters and TPLF commanders who broke with the party. Getachew Reda, the political figure linked to them, was expelled from the TPLF in 2024 and removed as Tigray’s interim president in 2025. He is now an adviser to Abiy, CNN reports. The TPLF-led side has reportedly aligned itself with Eritrea, and I follow that claim in a separate piece.

Young men are leaving Tigray for Addis Ababa to avoid forced recruitment, Al Jazeera reported on 25 September. Human Rights Watch has reported forced recruitment of civilians in Tigray since at least April, including children as young as 15. The TPLF disputes the allegations and says young people are joining voluntarily.

Forced recruitment has been reported on the government side too. In late 2024, Ethiopia’s Human Rights Commission found that Oromia regional authorities and security forces allied with the federal government detained many people, including children, to push them into the army, VOA reported.

Fleeing does not guarantee safety. A European monitoring group reported on 24 September that 21 air strikes had hit Alamata, and the EU said Ethiopian drone strikes had worsened the humanitarian situation. Hospital sources later told the BBC that 52 civilians were killed around Alamata over three days of heavy fighting, according to Africanews. A drone strike on October 20 killed four people and injured six, according to residents quoted by Addis Standard, which places it in the village of Finaruo in Saharti Samre (the AP, on Al Jazeera, places it in Mekelle, so the location is disputed), and humanitarian organisations put the number displaced across Tigray and Afar at no fewer than 150,000, the same report says, via AllAfrica.

It is deeply sad that Tigrayan youth are fleeing, leaving their families and businesses behind to avoid being taken to fight. And fleeing does not make their families safe. Their families are being bombarded by the Ethiopian government, so none of them is safe. Even if a young man leaves the country, he risks losing his life or being captured or abducted by the Ethiopian government. So it is a double-edged sadness. I would say the Tigray movement should reconsider this approach. I know it is not only Tigrayans doing this. I am sure the Ethiopian government is doing the same thing. What I am saying is that this is unfortunate, and it needs to stop immediately.

Why the neighbours cannot stay out

Egypt has long feared the GERD will cut its share of Nile water, and the river supplies almost all of Egypt’s freshwater, Al Jazeera has reported. Ethiopia says the dam will not affect Egypt’s share.

Ethiopian troops serving under the African Union mission have a command headquarters in Baidoa and operate across Gedo, Bay, Bakool and Hiiraan. Bloomberg reported on September 30 that Ethiopia plans to pull more than 3,000 troops out of Somalia. I have found no confirmation that any have left, and a Somali defence official said Mogadishu had not been informed. Somalia’s deputy foreign minister, Hassan Nadaara, said Somalia had received no official notice of any withdrawal and would take no side in the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute, Kulu Media reported on October 12.

Somalia already hosts 23,645 Ethiopian refugees and asylum seekers, according to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR, and tens of thousands more pass through each year on the route to Yemen. In the 1977 to 1978 Ogaden war, about 800,000 people crossed into Somalia. Al-Shabaab, for its part, still has a real presence in the border regions of Gedo and Bakool and pressures Hiiraan, and it recruits from displacement camps. Villa Somalia is the presidential palace in Mogadishu.

If Ethiopia falls into full civil war, civilians will flee, and they will flee to the closest border. Somalia is one of those borders, and the two countries share a long frontier. They will flee into Somalia, and the first places they reach will be close to Al-Shabaab-controlled territory. So Al-Shabaab may recruit these people. It could gain a big force from people fleeing the war in Ethiopia. This is a big challenge for the Somali government and the Somali people. Somalia has to play a key role in stabilizing Ethiopia. Somalia is already in chaos. The government controls some parts of the country, Al-Shabaab controls others, and some regions do not align with Villa Somalia’s policy. This is also bad for Somaliland, because it also shares a border with Ethiopia. So it is not a good thing for this conflict to continue. Or is it a good thing for it to go further?

Why Hassan Sheikh went to Addis Ababa, and what changed

President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud met Abiy in Addis Ababa on 29 September, went on to Djibouti, and reached Egypt on 2 October. Egypt’s presidency said Sisi met him on 3 October, Daily News Egypt reported. A four-way summit with Eritrea’s Isaias Afwerki and Sudan’s Burhan took place on 4 October, and the four leaders declared that Red Sea control should stay with coastal states, which Al Jazeera says appears aimed at Ethiopia. No official source has said why Hassan Sheikh made the Addis Ababa trip. A senior diplomatic source told Dawan, in an editorial, that the meeting with Abiy was Abiy’s idea and that its agenda was limited to the security situation in the two countries.

My own reading, before the summit, was that the trip could mean several things. It could mean he was telling Abiy: “Whatever is planned to be discussed in Egypt, as president of Somalia I am a middleman. I will not support any topic that is critical to Ethiopia’s security. I am not on anyone’s side. I just want to keep the peace.” Or he went to Ethiopia to make a trade: “I have issues in Beledweyne, in the Hiiraan region, and in Jubaland, a federal member state, so your army in Gedo can help deal with the Jubaland leader, Ahmed Madobe.” Then he went to Djibouti, because Djibouti has an army in Hiiraan. There he may have been saying: “I do not want the elections held on 30 September to lead to opposition. I want Hiiraan in the hands of Villa Somalia.” Then he went to Egypt, and a meeting there was bound to worry Ethiopia, which already has a conflict at home and blames Eritrea, Egypt and Sudan for supporting Tigray. I thought he went to meet Abiy to say: “Relax, we will not make the war worse, we will just talk about these things.” After Hassan Sheikh is done with Galmudug and Hirshabelle, he may put his full focus on Jubaland.

The go-between reading looks weaker now that he has put his name to a declaration that appears aimed at Ethiopia. Somalia has since said it is neutral, and Hassan Sheikh is reported as saying Somalia is open to Ethiopia using one to three Somali ports if the terms are negotiated with Mogadishu, FTL Somalia reported, without giving a date for the remarks. On October 18, Egypt’s foreign minister and Somalia’s discussed “follow-up” to the Alamein summit by phone, Egypt Today reported. My reading is that he is trying to hold two doors open, neutral in Addis Ababa and a partner in Cairo.

Could it have gone differently, and what do I not know?

Somalia could have said, in public, what the president’s trip was for. Nobody did, so speculation, including my own above, filled the gap. The African Union could have pressed to bring Eritrea and the Red Sea question into the Pretoria process. Instead the people most at risk, Tigrayan youth who flee and Somali families near the border, learn about decisions the way I learned about the dam, by watching faces in a corridor.

The strongest objection is that I may be overstating the risk to Somalia. Ethiopia’s war may stay inside Ethiopia, refugees have so far gone mostly elsewhere, and Al-Shabaab does not need Ethiopian refugees to recruit. I cannot rule that out. I have found no evidence yet of a surge of refugees crossing into Somalia, and I do not know whether the troop pullout reported by Bloomberg will happen. I also do not know what Hassan Sheikh and Abiy said to each other, or whether a negotiated route to the sea would calm the region or inflame it. The numbers on civilian deaths are not confirmed by any neutral body.

If the war does spread, the Egyptian diplomat’s words from that corridor will have been right in a way he did not mean. For some governments it will remain regional diplomacy. For the families on the road between Tigray and the Somali border, it will be life and death.

For the day-by-day record, with every claim labelled, see our live tracker.

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Updates to this piece

  • October 26, 2026. Rebuilt as an argument opening on the author's African Union corridor scene; folded in the October 22 update; added the October 20 Finarwa strike and displacement figure, Somalia's neutrality statement, Hassan Sheikh's port remark and the Egypt-Somalia call; removed an unverified report about Bishoftu.
  • October 22, 2026. Added update: Mekelle taken (Oct 3), Tigray caretaker administration (Oct 16), Alamein summit held (Oct 4), Alamata toll replaced with 52 civilians reported killed, Ethiopian troop pullout from Somalia still unconfirmed; fixed future tenses; softened the deck line about Somalia.
Archived copies of the sources linked in this piece (18)

Links to the Internet Archive's saved copy of each page, in case the original changes or disappears. usnews.com · aljazeera.com · ktvz.com · allafrica.com · aljazeera.com (2) · voanews.com · eepa.be · africanews.com · aljazeera.com (3) · garoweonline.com · somaliguardian.com · eastleighvoice.co.ke · mixedmigration.org · hornreview.org · adf-magazine.com · dailynewsegypt.com · aljazeera.com (4) · dawan.africa

Ismail Abukar

Ismail Abukar

Founder and editor of The Field. Independent investigative journalist.

Ismail Abukar is an independent investigative journalist. Over seven years of primary field research inside Somalia's prisons and military courts, including about 500 interviews with convicted Al-Shabaab operatives and a review of 400 military court cases, he has reported on Al-Shabaab, arbitrary detention and political accountability. His investigations have been published by Lawfare, African Arguments, Horn Observer and Pambazuka News, and his research has been cited by Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and the U.S. State Department. He holds an MA in International Law and Human Rights from UPEACE (2021). He founded The Field to give reporters who were there a place to publish. He is also co-founder and chairperson of the Organization for Prisoners' Rights (OPR), a separate nonprofit in Mogadishu that has no role in funding or editing The Field.

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